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September 6, 1988

Honorable Robert Gates
Deputy Director of
Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505

Dear Bob,

Enclosed please find the page proofs for your
(essay/discussant remarks) in Intelligence
Requirements for the 1990's. We would be grateful
if you could review this for any problems that may
have developed in the final copyediting and
typesetting stages.

In order to keep to the publisher's production
schedule we must have your corrections by this
Friday, September 9. Please call either myself or
Jeff Berman and dictate any changes that are
absolutely necessary. The book is scheduled to be
published in mid-November. — *at the earliest*

Again, many thanks.

Sincerely,

Roy
Roy Godson

Enclosure

files on lines 38, 122, 162, 273, 274

*Telephoned
Jeff Berman
7 Sept 88*

10 Discussion

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15 Robert Gates

16 To a substantial degree, the chapter, although addressed to intelli-
17 gence requirements for analysis in the 1990s, could have applied to
18 intelligence analysis in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s.

19 In examining this chapter, my comments are divided into three
20 categories: first, the relationship between the analyst and the policy-
21 maker; second, the analysts' background, recruitment, and training;
22 and third, intelligence requirements.

23 First, the analyst and the policymaker. Paul Seabury writes that
24 "intelligence should not crave for itself a puristic, aloof independence
25 akin to academic freedom." I could not agree more. I recall during
26 James Schlesinger's brief tenure as director of central intelligence his
27 complaint that the people at the CIA had forgotten they worked for
28 the U.S. government. It seems to me that support for policymakers
29 also means, on a fairly regular basis, telling them things they do not
30 like to hear. In fact, unless intelligence officers are down in the trenches
31 with the policymakers, understand the issues, and know what U.S.
32 objectives are, how the process works, and who the people are, they
33 cannot possibly provide either relevant or timely intelligence that will
34 contribute to better informed decisions.

35 I have spoken recently of a significant degree of institutional au-
36 tonomy for the CIA, and Seabury's paper addresses this topic. Au-
37 tonomy is positive in that intelligence analysis is not subject to the
38 parochial views of one or another policy agent. By the same token,
39 autonomy is negative if it somehow involves being aloof or apart from
40 the policy process and from those who seek intelligence support. I am
41 also very sympathetic to Eliot Cohen's concern over the concept of

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no-fault intelligence—that is, the idea that all the United States' problems somehow derive from the failure of policymakers or failures inherent in the intelligence issues with which they deal.

I agree with Cohen that in the past inaccurate intelligence analysis either contributed to faulty decisions or allowed policymakers to go on their way without having to deal with at least an alternative perspective. Some of these shortcomings have been due to inadequacies in the way the United States approached the analysis itself as well as the substantive advice of the analysts involved. In recognition of this, significant changes were made in the CIA's Directorate of Intelligence (DDI) concerning both its organization and approach to analysis in the early 1980s.

With respect to background, recruitment, and training, to which both authors devote considerable attention, let me first acknowledge Cohen's point about the large number of relatively new analysts in the CIA and in other intelligence agencies. The fact is that some (probably half) of the analysts in the CIA have on the order of only five to ten years of experience. The exodus of officers from the CIA's clandestine service in the second half of the 1970s has been widely commented on. It is less widely-known that at least as high a percentage of people also left from the analytical side of the house. They did so for three reasons. First, a generation that had come into the CIA in the late 1940s and early 1950s came to the end of their careers. Second, during the late 1970s the government made it financially very attractive for people to retire. Third, and equally important, many people in both directorates—operations and intelligence—found after the travails of the 1970s that the business was no longer very much fun. Therefore, many who could have stayed longer left. New analysts had to be hired to replace those who departed. Additionally, there was significant growth in the size of the analytical directorate. The result of all these factors was a substantial number of relatively new analysts with the attendant loss of experience and institutional memory.

Perhaps I reflect a certain generational difference in saying that there was a good side to this as well. These new people did not carry a lot of baggage from the past, including old fights with other intelligence agencies, did not carry scars from old wars with policymakers, and especially had backgrounds that were in many respects superior to those of the people they replaced in terms of area and language expertise.

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82 Concerning recruitment, Seabury speaks of the overreliance on
83 "highly homogeneous, young, inexperienced Caucasians with top rec-
84 ords of academic performance coming from good, middle-class fam-
85 ilies." I share this concern that U.S. recruitment brings a heavy
86 percentage of these people. In a 1973 article critical of U.S. intelli-
87 gence work on the Soviet Union, I noted that there is "a wide cultural
88 gap between a college-educated analyst in the West, and the Soviet
89 leadership. The same thing might be said of Iranians, Chinese, and a
90 variety of others."

91 This cultural gap can be overcome in two ways—first, by looking
92 for people with intensive foreign studies backgrounds and languages
93 who have lived abroad, and second, by looking for people immersed
94 in the culture of a country for a long period. To the extent the United
95 States is unable to hire immigrants from other countries for its own
96 employees, it should look at them for insight in the analysis of other
97 cultures. It seems to me the United States has been deficient in this
98 respect in taking advantage of both émigrés and defectors.

99 I agree with both authors that the United States needs analysts
100 with language skills, extensive knowledge of history, and significantly
101 greater cultural diversity. I further agree that the cadre of not only
102 U.S. intelligence analysts but also U.S. officials in general is consid-
103 erably more parochial culturally today than it was in the 1950s. In
104 fact, some of those who helped found the clandestine service probably
105 could not get in the CIA today.

106 Now, let us look at training. The Cohen essay draws on an article
107 titled "Managing/Teaching New Analysts." He cites the article as
108 saying that "the manager's first task is akin to deprogramming—
109 undoing habits formed in four to ten years of college-level work."
110 Cohen suggests, "The remark about deprogramming reveals a disdain
111 for . . . universities." In Seabury's essay, he observes, "[T]he intel-
112 ligence community has no raison d'être other than that of furnishing
113 information, reasoned judgments, and estimates on which rational
114 action is possible. In this the intelligence community differs greatly
115 from the ethos of the academy."

116 It seems to me there are three areas where academic training should
117 contribute to the formation of an intelligence analyst. The first is in
118 making the analyst understand that brevity is critical. Second is the
119 amassing of detail according to a clear line of analysis and drawing
120 clear conclusions. Third is ensuring relevance and timeliness so as to
121 enable action. This is hardly what most graduate programs teach.

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114 • *Intelligence Requirements for the 1990s*^{interpretation}

122 I agree that training and education in the ~~interrelation~~ of foreign
 123 cultures is critical. Cohen cites Abram Shulsky as saying that "the
 124 problem of penetrating another government's workings does not re-
 125 semble the challenge of unraveling 'a hidden, but ultimately knowable
 126 process of nature.' Rather, it is a 'struggle between two human intel-
 127 ligences each of which is trying to outpsych the other. . . .'" I con-
 128 cede that in the past too many intelligence managers placed little value
 129 on the idea that people of other cultures have different habits of
 130 thought, values, and motivations. These managers apparently rejected
 131 the idea that somebody who presumably has an intimate knowledge
 132 of cultural differences has any particular usefulness. But that view—
 133 and that view did exist to a considerable extent—is largely a thing
 134 of the past, or least I hope it is.

135 Citing again my 1973 article, I said, "The fact remains that our
 136 perception of situations is widely divergent from the Kremlin's per-
 137 ception. The Soviet Union has a strange and idiosyncratic policy not
 138 to be dealt with without conscious effort." I added,

140 An analyst trying to understand the Soviet leaders or their approach
 141 to problems is seriously handicapped without a background in Rus-
 142 sian history and culture, and the importance of this can hardly be
 143 overemphasized. I recommend that intelligence agencies should take
 144 steps to insure that future analysts have training in Russian and
 145 Soviet history and culture, that analysts without such training should
 146 be sent to school to acquire it.

148 In 1973, I was a fairly lonely voice arguing for this. At that time, I
 149 was the only person in my unit in the DDI with an academic back-
 150 ground in Soviet studies. My first branch chief was an expert on the
 151 Middle East, and the other chief under whom I worked was an expert
 152 on Southeast Asia. Because of hiring policies in the last decade, this
 153 situation has changed dramatically.

154 Both essays speak of mirror imaging. I believe it is this lack of
 155 regional expertise that contributes significantly to mirror imaging.
 156 This problem has diminished in recent years, in part because of the
 157 changes in hiring practices and in the number of people who have
 158 area expertise and experience. I accept totally Dr. Cohen's emphasis
 159 on the importance of intelligence highlighting the otherness of the
 160 enemy.

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161 With respect to training and education of analysts in the 1990s,
162 I would like to quote Fritz Ermarth in dividing what the United States
163 does not know into two categories: secrets and mysteries. Secrets are
164 those things that are potentially knowable. Cohen's example is the
165 physics underlying a Soviet barrage attack. Mysteries, again to use
166 Cohen's point of reference, have to do with the interpretation of for-
167 eign cultures, with that struggle between two human intelligences each
168 trying to outpsych the other.

169 In the latter, there are often no clear-cut answers, often because
170 the other leaders themselves do not know what they are going to do
171 or have not worked out their problems. Here our best contribution
172 can be to help the policymaker understand the thought processes in-
173 volved, the other person's approach to the problem and how it is
174 consistent with his culture, the alternatives that are open to the other
175 culture, and our estimate as to which alternative the other culture is
176 most likely to choose.

177 We have taken a number of steps to deal with the need described
178 in both essays for varied backgrounds and languages. In an ideal
179 world, every analyst we hired would have specialized background
180 knowledge and one or more foreign languages as a usable tool. In the
181 real world of American education and people who can meet U.S.
182 security qualifications, these two do not necessarily coincide. How-
183 ever, between 40 and 50 percent of all those hired as political analysts
184 do meet these substantive qualifications, and we try to give the others
185 additional education so they can do as well.

186 For example, over the years we have sent a number of people to
187 Chinese and Russian studies programs to learn both language and
188 history. We also try to educate our analysts to deal with problems
189 not addressed in universities. For example, we have a deception anal-
190 ysis course on the techniques and practices of deception and the meth-
191 odology for identifying them. For two years we have been teaching a
192 seminar on intelligence successes and failures that uses case studies to
193 illustrate causes of intelligence failures and how to encourage more
194 effective analysis. It is one of our most popular courses. We have
195 added other courses as well in an effort to help improve our under-
196 standing of foreign cultures and add ground truth to our analysts'
197 views.

198 Let me close my discussion of training with several observations,
199 beginning with Dr. Seabury's reference to Angelo Codevilla's paper

200 discussing empiricism in American culture. It seems to me that intel-
201 ligence analysis must combine an examination of empirical factors
202 with a range of other considerations, including motivation, commit-
203 ment, determination, history, logic, and motive. In those areas where
204 empirical evidence or intelligence is ambiguous or even absent, there
205 is always the danger of saying that because nobody heard or saw the
206 tree fall, it must not have fallen. If a question arises about whether
207 or not a foreign nation is doing something, and if the information is
208 scanty, analysts must take into account the nation's past behavior,
209 whether it had a motive for such activity, and whether that action
210 would be a logical extension of the motive. I think the United States'
211 experience with terrorism is an example. Thus, there is no question
212 that the United States has to take into account nonempirical
213 considerations.

214 Analysts must build a case regardless of the nature of the project.
215 They must bring together both empirical data and subjective consid-
216 erations in describing events that have taken place or policies as they
217 have been developed. Only if analysts establish a presumptive and
218 persuasive base of argumentation—a case, if you will—can they then
219 bring the reader along when they begin to speculate about the future.
220 It seems to me that analysts must persuade policymakers that they,
221 the analysts, know what they are talking about, have mastered the
222 material, and understand the culture with which they are dealing be-
223 fore they have the credibility to forecast the future.

224 In dealing with the so-called mysteries, analysts have to discuss
225 the alternative ways events may develop. At the same time, the intel-
226 ligence community owes policymakers a clear-cut best estimate. An-
227 alysts are not paid simply to provide an array of alternatives or options.
228 Policymakers want to have some sense of what analysts think will
229 happen. Analysts need to be honest with policymakers concerning the
230 quality of their evidence and the degree of confidence they have in
231 their judgments.

232 Today, a high priority is being attached to hiring analysts who
233 have lived abroad and have area expertise and knowledge of foreign
234 languages. We also are attaching a high priority to developing exten-
235 sive contacts with experts in the academic community and think tanks
236 in order to have people challenge the analysts' views and bring other
237 information and perspectives to bear on problems. As for problems
238 of deception and denial, thanks in substantial measure to the efforts

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of Senator Wallop and Angelo Codevilla, they have become a growing part of our analyst training curriculum. These and all other changes I have been speaking about proceed at different paces, but substantial progress has been made. We have to keep the pressure on to keep these changes going.

Finally, because both authors focus primarily on training—that is, the need for analysts to be familiar with foreign, and shall we say alien, cultures—there is very little focus in either essay on substantive requirements. Let me address what they do say and make a few observations of my own.

Paul Seabury focuses on the need for analysts who can see connections between widely separated trends and events. One of the disadvantages of a regional organization for analysis is that it tends to make the interconnection of such events more difficult. It was in recognition of this that we created several organizations to try to bridge these regional patterns. We created an insurgency center, an organization designed to track patterns of subversion, particularly of Soviet, Cuban, and Libyan involvement in insurgencies around the world. We have tried to establish some connections that will enable us to address these transregional phenomena.

One of the more important assets we have in connection with this is with academics and think tanks. The people in these pursuits can often give us the macro analysis that at least points us in the right direction or suggests the right questions to ask.

I think Dr. Cohen has put his finger on a larger issue with respect to requirements for the 1990s. He writes, "[H]enceforth the United States will no longer have the luxury of concentrating its intelligence assets overwhelmingly on its chief target, the Soviet Union." He then points to a number of other problems that are certain to become significant intelligence challenges. I not only agree, I believe that this trend began several years ago, and now only about 50 percent of the assets of the intelligence community are focused on the Soviet problem.

My principal worry for the 1990s is that the absence of intelligence guidance and priorities from the senior levels of the policy community will result in a continued diffusion of efforts as the United States is pushed in the direction of satisfying an increasingly wide range of problems. In anticipation of the 1990s, the intelligence community itself is going to be forced to reexamine its priorities and at some point inform the policy community and Congress that it can no

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278 longer carry out an open-ended program of collection and analysis
279 on every conceivable subject of interest to the U.S. government.

280 Beginning with the Soviet Union, the United States is going to
281 have to identify the hard-core issues on which it will devote all the
282 necessary resources to resolving the problem satisfactorily, knowing
283 in advance that this choosing will withdraw an intelligence effort
284 from areas that are peripheral to national security concerns but have
285 influential bureaucratic and congressional constituencies. Identifying
286 those areas other than the Soviet Union will be a difficult and painful
287 task.

288 Although I am a strong supporter of the idea of specialized area
289 training and having analysts who have not only lived in a foreign
290 country but also have studied its language and culture and are steeped
291 in its history, I must say that regional experts are often less competent
292 in forecasting discontinuities. It is often forgotten that the CIA's an-
293 alyst on Iran in the 1970s had worked on Iran for twenty years. That,
294 in my view, was part of the problem. Although a deep understanding
295 of a country's politics and history will help in understanding its ac-
296 tions and reactions, the fact is that in most countries actions are part
297 of long, continuous chains of events. Thus, those most familiar with
298 these long, slow processes are those who will find reasons to say that
299 the warning signs of instability have occurred before, fit into a his-
300 torical pattern, and therefore can be dismissed. Maybe they are right,
301 and maybe they are not. For this reason, there must be a combination
302 of people with area expertise and those who fly broadly, who ask
303 hard and sometimes even simple questions. Also needed are those
304 who have unorthodox views and challenge the conventional wisdom.

305 Dr. Cohen speaks of short-term analysis rather than long-term
306 research. This was a significant problem until a few years ago. With
307 the personnel drawdown in the 1970s, the CIA was forced to abandon
308 its long-range research on Soviet defense industries and also on
309 the Third World. The mail of the day always had to be answered.
310 One of the principal benefits of the significant resources provided by
311 both the administration and the Congress during the 1980s has been
312 to allow the establishment of a significant foundation for a long-term
313 research program in which the resources for carrying out these proj-
314 ects are protected. The analytical directorate of the CIA has been able
315 to produce five hundred to seven hundred new billets for this purpose.
316 Thus, this long-standing problem has been largely brought under con-

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317 trol. Most analysts now understand that an inability to produce longer-
318 range research could have a deleterious effect on their careers.

319 Finally, I would like to say that Robert Butterworth's paper on
320 collection notes that collection and analysis are inseparable and that
321 intelligence errs in making the division between them great, both bu-
322 reaucratically and in other ways. In the abstract, I endorse this. But
323 I would also say that in reality, from the management standpoint, it
324 is difficult to avoid this division. Rather it is important to have many
325 bridges connecting these two intimately related subjects.

11 Andrew Marshall

12 Both essays address basic issues regarding analysis and discuss how
13 current analytical problems might change or be improved in the fu-
14 ture. I would like to reinforce the view expressed by both Eliot Cohen
15 and Paul Seabury that the next ten to twenty years are going to see
16 major changes in world affairs. Some recent projections indicate that
17 by 2010 the Soviet Union probably will have, at most, only the fourth
18 largest gross national product (GNP) in the world. China and Japan
19 will probably rise to be important powers. What China and Japan do
20 with their industrial base and wealth is a key issue and will depend
21 on factors about which the United States knows little—their strategic
22 cultures and future resource allocation decisions. For example, Chinese
23 military traditions and ways of thinking are very different from the
24 United States'. For that reason alone, the intelligence community will
25 have its work cut out for it as it tries to foresee likely evolutions of
26 future Chinese military forces and operational concepts.

27 There is likely to be a world of three, four, or five major actors
28 instead of only two major ones. Coalitions and interactions of these
29 major players will create a more complex political-military world.
30 Military technology and production of weapons will probably spread
31 to a still greater number of countries. Further, a new wave of military
32 technology will become available in the next twenty years, and some
33 of the major powers may open up a gap relative to the others. These
34 and other changes will require that major adjustments be made in
35 U.S. intelligence analytic capabilities.

36 I share the view that the training of analysts has not received the
37 attention it should have. Perhaps some experiments in the selection

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